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The thrust of this paper concerns the case of the European Battlegroup (BG) non- 
deployment in late 2008, when the United Nations requested European military 
support for the United Nations Organisation Mission peacekeeping force in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The argument is built on the fact that 
when, in official documents, the EU approaches the European security and 
ESDP/CSDP’s military crisis management policy and interventions, it makes strong 
references to the United Nations and the UN Charter Chapter VII’s mandate of 
restoring international peace and security. Such references make it seem that 
supporting the UN when it deals with threats and crises is a primary concern of the 
EU and the member states. These allusions lead to the main contention of this paper, 
that there is much ambivalence in these indications. The paper develops its argument 
from one key hypothesis; namely, that the non- deployment of a European BG in the 
DRC, at the end of 2008, constitutes a useful case study for detecting a number of 
ambiguities of the EU in respect of its declarations in the official documents 
establishing the European military crisis management intervention structure. 
Keywords: European battlegroup; common security and defence policy; DRC 2008; 
military crisis management 
Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the European Union (EU) before the Lisbon Treaty was 
made active, thus it refers to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
though this is now transformed by the Treaty into the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). The paper’s thrust concerns the case of the European 
Battlegroup (BG) non-deployment in late 2008, when the United Nations 
requested European military support for the United Nations Organisation 
Mission (MONUC) peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), the very task of the EU battlegroup. The argument is built on 
the fact that when the European Union approaches in the official documents the 
European security and ESDP/CSDP’s military crisis management policy and 
interventions, it makes strong references to the United Nations and the UN 
Charter Chapter VII’s mandate of restoring interna- tional peace and security. 
This, per se, is unsurprising. Numerous documents, also beyond the area of 
military crisis management and European security more in general, link the EU 
to the idea of multilateralism and good governance. However, such references 
make it seem that supporting the UN when it deals with threats and crises is a 
primary concern of the EU and the member states. These allusions lead to the 
main contention of this paper, that there is much ambivalence in these 
indications. The paper develops its argument from one key hypothesis; namely, 
that the case of non-deployment of a European BG in the DRC, at the end of 
2008, constitutes a useful case study for detecting a number of ambiguities of 
the EU in respect of its declarations in the official documents establishing the 
European military crisis management intervention structure. There are 
limitations to this case study, specifically owing to the fact that firm 
conclusions of the type that a comparative approach might yield are difficult to 
reach by conducting a case study based upon a single case. A further limitation 
is due to the fact that, although there are several instances of the EU/member 
states offering crucial support to the UN (dealing with the regimes as well as 
humanitarian crises, in full observance of Chapter VII of the Charter) thus 
featuring examples that contrast with the present case, this paper does not 
include them. 
The EU’s practice of ‘linking’ the official acts to the UN is treaty-based, as it is 
noticeable in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), i.e. art.3 paragr.5; art. 
21 paragr.1 & 2; art. 34 paragr. 2; and art. 42 paragr. 1 & 7. Working on the 
above hypothesis, the paper first focuses on the EU’s military crisis 
management official discourse giving emphasis to the association with the UN. 
It then highlights the ESDP policy of developing the battlegroup concept, and 
makes references to Operation Artemis that might serve as a contrast to the 
case of 2008. It thus looks at the kind of operations that BGs are supposed to 
perform and at the differences with the NATO Response Force (NRF) in terms 
of structure and size, at the African focus of the EU BG concept, and at the 
way in which the NRF was a failure and the EU BG concept flawed. The first 
task of the paper is to try to find an answer to why the EU uses the practice of 
‘linking’ the official acts to the UN. 
Second, and continuing to work on the hypothesis, the paper brings in the case 
of the possible action of deployment of BGs: here it pays attention to the UN’s 
demand for a military contribution, and looks at General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) meeting seeking to trace the national positions of 
some EU states. It points out a few instances of ambiguity including that of the 
BG concept, and considers whether the EU was obliged to deploy. This paper’s 
second task is to try to understand the way in which the European negative 
response was built. 
Third, the paper seeks to figure out why those EU states that were in charge of 
deploying had not done so. Thus it enquires into the difficulties and obstacles 
that informed the national stances of Britain and Germany regarding the BG 
deployment in the DRC. The paper’s third task is to find out the main cause for 
inaction in late 2008. 
The intention of this paper is not to identify the extent of EU/member states’ 
contribution to the UN dimension of military crisis management operation. The 
focus is not on the situation in the DRC and its complexities, nor on the EU’s 
and the European Commission’s efforts to bring stability and peace to the 
Congo, nor on the EU engaging in partnership with the African Union (AU). 
The paper’s approach is essentially inductive, based largely on official 
documents, political speeches, government statements as well as secondary 
sources, and is supplemented by interviews especially with EU officers in 
Brussels. 
High-quality literature exists that focuses on the EU and the tension between 
aspiration and capacity, rhetoric and reality. Hill (1993, 1998), Holland (1995), 
Dover (2005) and many other scholars were inspired by the paradoxes 
highlighted by the EU’s ambitions. This paper deals with a similar topic, but it 
uses the specific key hypothesis expressed above to uncover the ambiguities of 
the EU and member states. 
The EU’s military crisis management discourse connecting to the UN 
In approaching European security and ESDP/CSDP’s military crisis 
management[1] interventions, the EU makes strong reference to the United 
Nations Charter. It thus appears a primary concern of the EU and member 
states to support the UN when this deals with threats and crises. The 
declarations are ambitious and keep raising expectations, with the risk that the 
EU and member states are not able to deliver on such an agenda. 
The pledges and aspirations are very noticeable in the EU’s security 
documents. The European Security Strategy (ESS) stresses the EU’s support to 
the UN ‘as it responds to threats to international peace and security’ (2003, p. 
11). The Le Touquet Franco-British agreement (2003) fixes some specific 
points about the importance of Africa: ‘we will take joint initiatives at the 
United Nations and within the European Union ensuring that they support the 
efforts of the African Union and of the sub- regional organisations, and that 
they strengthen Africa’s peacekeeping capability’. France and Britain 
expressed their sustainment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and for the Action Plan for Africa, even highlighting that their 
‘cooperation in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa can be a driving force in 
the European Union, promoting peace’ (LeTouq 2003). The declaration on the 
European Cooperation in Security and Defence, issued at the Franco-British 
summit in London (2003), asserts that ‘credible Battlegroup sized forces [are 
planned] to be created so as to strengthen the EU rapid reaction capability to 
support United Nations’ operations’. The declaration states a desire to construct 
‘the relationship between the EU and the UN in the field of crisis 
management’. It underscores that the ‘EU should build on this precedent (i.e. 
operation Artemis in the DRC) so that it is able to respond through ESDP to 
future similar requests’ (UK/F 2003). In 2004, the Council ‘endorse[d] the 
elaboration of modalities under which the EU could provide military 
capabilities’, again with reference to the UN (EU Council, June 2004). That 
same year, the Headline Goal 2010 (re-)affirmed that ‘[s]trengthening the 
United Nations is a European priority’ (p. 5), and that ‘Real world experience [. 
. .] has shown the potential for the EU to conduct operations in support of UN 
objectives’ (p. 4); and again referred to the ‘development of EU Rapid 
Response elements, including Battlegroups’, and to their task (p. 5). The HG 
2010 also declared that ‘the EU will promote the principle of interoperability in 
the field of military capabilities with its partners, notably . . . the UN . . . in line 
with the European Security Strategy’ (p. 4). This is not a minor point, since the 
interoperability of forces and equipment did in reality constitute a problem with 
respect to military cooperation. 
In 2005, the EU was at the forefront of the diplomacy that resulted in the UN 
General Assembly’s agreement with the notion of ‘responsibility [. . .] to help 
protect [R2P] populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity’ (UNGA 2005). Support for the R2P was included in 
the ‘Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities’, adopted by the December 
2008 European Council. The R2P implies high-intensity operations if military 
intervention becomes necessary, the precise task of the EU BGs (Biscop 2009, 
p. 378). The 2008 EU presidency’s conclusions emphasised the policy 
guideline that ‘the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we 
must be’, underscoring that ‘[b]attlegroups...have enhanced our capacity to 
react rapidly’ (p. 9), and the ESS Implementation Report ends with a firm call 
to action (S407/08 2008). The way the EU devised its security policy and the 
strategic and operational preparation of the rapid reaction force created 
expectations. The assurances made to the UN in the official documents seemed 
to promise consistent action. 
Was the battlegroup concept devised in response to a request by the UN? 
The Union placed emphasis on the importance of developing the EU Rapid 
Response element. The origin of the BG concept was linked to the growing 
problems on the African continent, where the Sub-Saharan region remained the 
theatre for 80 per cent of the world’s civil wars and prevalent state failures. 
State failure was having destabilising effects in regions such as in the Great 
Lakes (Howorth 2007, p. 202, 251), and these conflicts were feeding the cycle 
of terrorism (ESS 2003). 
The concept was devised in response to a request by the UN to support the 
pressurised UN troops (Koops 2007, p. 2), and complied with the UN Charter’s 
Chapter VII mandate, which set out the authority of the Security Council in 
maintaining peace worldwide.[2] The rapid response elements originated at the 
Helsinki Council Summit (1999) and from the 2003 Headline Goal (HG 2003). 
The need for rapid deployment was made clear during the British intervention 
in Sierra Leone (May 2000) and during the French operation Licorne on the 
Ivory Coast (September 2002). France and Britain (Le Touquet, February 
2003) supported the idea of a conceptual framework for the conduct of EU-led 
military crisis management actions, based on the Military Rapid Response 
Concept. The project was later made more explicit in London (UK/F 2003), 
and became a trilateral initiative when Germany joined (February 2004). 
During the 1999-2003 period, the EU set-up political-military structures to 
assess, plan and execute military operations. These structures were tested 
during the military actions Concordia (in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, FYROM) and Artemis (in the DRC) (2003). Concordia was made 
possible through the use of the NATO machinery under the ‘Berlin Plus’ 
agreement, and Artemis employed European capabilities and command 
structures. 
Operation Artemis is important to this paper’s narrative in terms of the pattern 
of behaviour of the EU and of the member states with regard to the 
development of European security policy. First, the EU states were humiliated 
by their incapacity to deal, in the late 1990s, with the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia and also their inability to avoid the humanitarian massacre 
occurring on the doorstep of the Union. The consequent policy of advancing 
European security by tackling a crisis using European military force, with no 
use of NATO assets, was put to the test with Artemis. That operation proved a 
deliberate contrast to the NATO/US dependency exhibited during Operation 
Concordia. It provided a logical follow-up to the 1998 Saint-Malo Franco-
British Declaration on European Defence. The clause ‘the European Union will 
also need to have recourse to suitable military means’, which also included 
‘national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework’, was 
given clear emphasis in the declaration (StM 1998). Artemis was purposely 
designed to demonstrate the EU’s ability to mount autonomous actions. One of 
the aims was to exhibit European military autonomy to the United States. 
Second, with Artemis, the EU member states (particularly France and those 
that opposed Operation Iraqi Freedom) sought to prove European unity to the 
USA, after the internal division over the Iraqi question. 
Why did the EU respond in 2003 to the direct request (via Paris) to the 
European Union by Kofi Annan, the then UN General Secretary, for military 
support in the DRC? Artemis provides a good contrast to the 2008 case of non-
deployment in the DRC. France has been the key actor in crafting Operation 
Artemis. Artemis offered the opportunity of ‘resuscitating’ the UN (Duke 
2008, p. 18) after Operation Allied Force intervened in the Balkans without a 
UN mandate. Paris was very keen to maintain a dominant role in its African 
backyard. It had lost significant leverage in that African region since the end of 
the cold war, and its engagement in a stronger European role in the 
management of African crises was France’s strategic consequence (Koepf 
2010, p. 8). Paris conducted intense diplomatic activity at the level of the 
Political Security Committee (PSC) to gain the EU states’ support for this 
operation (Hendrickson et al. 2008). Together with being a landmark in the 
debate on the use of force in the PSC, Artemis was also an indication to all 
member states that Africa was now ‘firmly on the map for Europe’ security and 
defence policy.[3] Paris succeeded in heading European policy towards 
France’s African interests. 
For the above (and the following) reasons, France was attracted by the Artemis 
kind of operation. It seemed a workable model to advance (both its own and) 
European security policy. France was the ‘framework nation’, which means 
that it acted as the main constituent of the battalion (supplying 1785 of the 
2200 troops deployed) and it conducted operational planning from the French 
Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Ope ́rations (CPCO) at Creil. This 
one seconded officers from 13 other countries. France has thus demonstrated 
the potential for the multinationalisation of a national Permanent Joint Head 
Quarters. It was willing to provide the Operational HQ and Forward HQ, and 
was clearly keen to demonstrate its ability to organise and conduct a EU 
operation with rapid force projection 6500 kilometres far away and into 
unfamiliar territory (see Cornish 2004, Ulriksen et al. 2004, Howorth 2007, p. 
233). These conditions and interests created a powerful influence in 2003 as the 
engine for European policy (and a keenness to deploy forces). These conditions 
and interests were not present in 2008 to affect European action, and make a 
difference with the late 2008 case of UN’s demand for European support. 
However, the apparent importance of Africa and its security, as suggested by 
the official documents, lay less in direct intervention of the Artemis variety, but 
rather in ‘support[ing] African mediation and the efforts to prevent and manage 
conflicts led by the African Union and the regional organisations’ (LeTouq 
2003). In the Le Touquet statement, France and Britain had made it clear that 
‘primary responsibility falls on Africa in this matter’ (i.e. bringing peace and 
solidarity), and they underscored their ‘support [of] the efforts of the African 
Union’. The most likely expected involvement in operations in Africa was of 
the kind of ‘joint ownership’ to back and sustain the African Union in Africa’s 
peacekeeping capability. Within the projects agreed between France and 
Britain there was also the initiative of exploring ‘how to work together to build 
a DRC national army’ (LeTouq). Therefore, security in Africa was better 
served by implementing these plans and ideas than by conducting actions of the 
Artemis type. 
Operation Artemis provided the Rapid Response elements with an operative 
template and laid the groundwork for the EU battlegroup concept (Lindstrom 
2007). When the BG concept was approved (by the PSC and by various other 
military and defence committees of the EU), it was subsequently integrated 
into the new Headline Goal (HG) 2010 at the European Council (June 
2004).[4] The EU/member states set themselves a new HG, reflecting the ESS, 
the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology, and the lessons 
learnt from the EU-led operations. 
Agreeing on the new HG meant complying, by 2010, with humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and the tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management including peacemaking (Petersberg tasks), and with joint 
disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, and 
security sector reform operations as part of a broader institution building 
approach (tasks from ESS) (Lindstrom 2007, p. 82). Accepting these targets 
implied that the EU/member states were willing to offer and provide support in 
cases of the UN needing European military support during crisis management 
operations. 
What kind of operations would be required of the battlegroups? 
The battlegroup was defined as ‘the minimum militarily effective, credible, 
rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, 
or for the initial phase of larger operations’ (DEMC 2004, p. 3). The concept 
drew on the NATO doctrine and the NATO Response Force. The latter also 
emerged in 2003, and was conceived as a means of providing NATO with a 
fast and vigorous military instrument. Since the NRF was at the same time 
conceived as encouraging an expeditionary frame of mind among the European 
allies (Ringsmose 2009, p. 288), it seems reasonable to pay some attention to 
the differences between the NRF and the BG concept. 
The conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and the intervention in Afghanistan in 
the aftermath of 11 September formed the direct background of the US-
sponsored NRF initiative. The transatlantic capability gap was a reality. Only a 
small part of NATO-Europe’s forces was organised for expeditionary 
operations. Washington envisaged NATO’s future as a global security 
provider, and planned the NRF to develop/expand the Europeans’ capability to 
participate in the American-led out-of- area operations. Through the European 
force contribution, it was also easier for Washington to gain political 
legitimacy for American military responses to new threats. The structure, size 
and conceptual configuration of the NRF were in remarkable contrast with 
those of the EU BGs. The 25,000 strong NRF was intended to be engaged in 
high-intensity operations alongside the US armed forces, and was thought to be 
deployable worldwide within 5-30 days, as established in document MC 477 
by the NATO Military Committee (April 2003). The central political rationale 
behind the NRF was the task of reinforcing the transatlantic link in times of 
crisis. Training served as preparation for major combat operations. This 
American logic was noticeable in NATO’s agreement (Prague Capability 
Commitment, November 2002) to a force that could work closely with the 
USA in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (Kugler 2007, p. 4). 
In terms of structure the NRF force looked like that of a US Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (Mihalka 2005; Ringsmose 2009, pp. 288-290). 
The European battlegroup initiative was purposely a less grandiose project. The 
BG concept implied two tasks: at the strategic level, it sought to address the 
EU’s need to assess a crisis independently and to consider its potential 
implications; at the operational level, it aimed at making the EU capable of 
planning and executing military operations and able to use exclusively 
European assets. The ambition of the EU was to be able to decide to launch an 
operation within five days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept 
by the Council, and to deploy its BG units of 1500 troops no later than ten days 
after (HG 2010, p. 2). The concept was backed by the employment of time 
limited missions of 30 days, extendable to a maximum of 120 days. After this 
limit, the operation would conclude. Relevant to this paper is the fact that the 
EU BG concept was designed with an African focus. It was meant to take 
action within a strategic environment characterised by the peace operations of 
the United Nations, the African Union and groupings such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in addition to the post-
colonial states and conflicts (Gowan 2005, p. 13). These were the main 
differences between the concept and configuration of the NRF and the EU BG 
rapid forces. Their divergent tasks also explain the size dissimilarity. 
Critics argue that the NATO Response Force faces a set of obstacles that 
closely mirror those of the EU BGs. These include problems filling the force 
catalogue, rhetoric and poor implementation, disagreement on which conflict to 
address, and trust in the available forces instead of creating the capacity to 
shape force planning (Jacoby and Jones 2008, p. 316). There are indications 
that the BG concept was flawed from the beginning (see below), had outlived 
its usefulness and that its unsoundness offered the main reason for the 
reservations about using it, apart from once in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also the 
NRF was a (‘qualified’) failure. It proved to be a disaster with its relief 
operation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (September 2005), and later 
with its other disaster relief effort in Pakistan (February 2006) following the 
October 2005 earthquake. After those experiences, the NRF was never used 
again in world operations (Ringsmose 2009, p. 291). 
Since the European BGs were primarily intended to reinforce the peace 
operations led by other groups and organisations, their strategic significance 
rests on the decision-making of these potential partners as well as on the 
choices of the EU. Observers from the UN Secretariat argue that the EU 
battlegroup will only have a long-lasting effect if it is entirely and efficiently 
intertwined with the plans and actions of the other partners. A not irrelevant 
paradox is that the EU battlegroup was meant to operate in an area where the 
EU/Europeans did actually have no clear ‘strategic’ vision of their own. The 
ESS pays little attention to Africa, apart from the countries of the 
Mediterranean. The BG may be justified as one element within a larger basket 
of long-term comprehensive interventions conducted at both the level of 
individual countries and regionally in support of the UN and the AU. It seems, 
however, that the EU emphasis on rapid reaction was incompatible with these 
long- term lines. The clearest criticism about the battlegroup describes it as a 
concept in search of a strategy (Gowan 2005, pp. 14-19), which explains why 
the concept was flawed from the beginning. Similarly to the case of the 
European BG, the other argument for the NRF is that political calculation has 
saved the NRF from being abandoned (Ringsmose 2009, p. 288). 
The above comments and criticisms, however, are not meant to deny that the 
battlegroup project was perhaps a political and military advance. The EU 
member states devised three types of BG for the operation: a national BG (with 
all components borrowed from the same country), a BG with a framework 
nation (following the ‘lead nation concept’ that implies that a EU member 
served as the main constituent of the BG, while other countries contributed 
according to their respective capacities), and a multinational BG. They decided 
to associate BGs with a force headquarters, and welcomed the inclusion in the 
BGs of non-EU European NATO countries, as well as countries that were 
candidates for accession to the EU (FCT 2005). 
Headquarters are the primary structures to make the battlegroup operational, so 
a few words on their use, their inherent dynamics, and on EU military expertise 
are appropriate here. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) offers expertise to the 
CSDP in the conduct of military crisis management operations in particular. 
The EUMS comprises officers seconded from member states. These have a 
great ability to generate specific types of HQ (forward, operational, etc.). The 
EUMS is in charge of early warning, evaluation and strategic planning for the 
missions. Great influential power is concentrated at this level to affect 
decisions about the need for a particular type of HQ and for planning 
operations. On the basis of the typology of the operation to be undertaken, 
there are different choices for employing HQ (i.e. the Berlin Plus arrangements 
allow the use of NATO’s Operational HQ, located in Belgium;[5] autonomous 
ESDP operations use one of the Operational Headquarters made available by 
five EU member states, France, the UK, Germany, Italy and Greece, which is 
then ‘multinationalised’;[6] the operations can be commanded from Brussels 
via the EU Operations Centre (OpsCen) within the EU Military Staff under 
guidance of a designated Operation Commander. The EU OpsCen is not a 
standing HQ and becomes operative through a Council joint action [see Simon 
et al. 2011, pp. 13-15, and Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, p. 180]).[7] 
The deployment of any national contingent within a BG was the result of the 
unanimous decision of the Council of the EU, in addition to the national 
government’s approval. Any choice to commit military force was a sovereign 
decision. In the case of the EU, there were two principal providers (France and 
the UK). The BGs could be deployed without UN authorisation such as at the 
invitation of a state, and were intended to undertake operations far from the 
EU’s borders and against robust adversaries (see Boyer 2007, Haine 2008). The 
EU/ member states fixed the objective of simultaneously dealing with two 
crisis management military operations (HG 2010; ENH 2008, Annex 2 2008, 
paragr. 3) implying that they desired to be capable of doing so. There was, 
however, concern over whether member states had sufficient willingness to 
deploy. 
Why make the connection with the UN? 
The question of conceiving a more robust European security structure, 
autonomous from NATO, and the task of executing military operations using 
exclusively European assets were divisive. Requiring the help of NATO forces 
to tackle the outbreak of the Balkan crises had proved an embarrassment. 
France and Britain were the most convinced not only that upgrading the level 
of European capability was needed, but that action to control and contain crises 
follows (Whitman 2004). Germany and the majority of member states 
perceived the need for a UN (or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, OSCE) mandate before starting an operation utilising the military. 
Vital to German foreign policy was ‘reflexive multilateralism’ (Katzenstein 
1997). When NATO made the decision to launch an air campaign to terminate 
the Kosovo conflict in March 1999, Germany participated in the 79-day 
campaign. The domestic debate and opposition were severe and fluctuated 
between the two poles of ‘no more genocide’ (in Kosovo and in the earlier 
campaign in Bosnia) and ‘no more war’. Italy adopted a standing analogous to 
that of Germany, with a similar history, which brought the country to privilege 
multilateralism and the UN framework for operations. 
By contrast, for France, the force projection increased its significance with the 
ending of the cold war, and was eased by the recognition of the military as a 
crucial foreign policy tool. French policy-makers have always been at ease 
with a combination of civilian and military means. Also for the UK, the 
keenness to use force was an agreed element of effective policy-making in 
some cases. In addition, it was a right of the government to commit UK forces 
to action. Parliament was not requested to vote on deployments, and this clause 
gave parliamentary debates on the question of the use of force a different 
aspect compared with, for example, those in the German Bundestag (Giegerich 
2006, p. 86, 138, 159), as well as those in the Italian parliament. 
The lack of a binding UN mandate for NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999 
exacerbated the debate among EU states on the question of intervention and led 
to many disagreements but, on the other hand, it produced the new context of 
EU ESDP. That period (i.e. the aftermath of Saint-Malo) was marked by a 
steady sequence of international events creating a highly unstable environment 
within which the newborn ESDP was forced to materialise. The prime ideas at 
the basis of the Helsinki HG (2003) originated from experiences in Kosovo 
(Howorth 2007, p. 104). The 1999 decision to confront Slobodan Milosevic 
with no UN mandate (backed by both present and prospective members of the 
EU) had outlined the conditions for debating the linkages between the political 
and operational dimensions of the UN. For many Europeans, the action was 
defendable by means of the UN norms, albeit it lacked official sponsorship by 
the Security Council (Gowan 2008, p. 48). When China and Russia threatened 
to veto any UN mandate for action, the Slovene ambassador protested that ‘not 
all permanent members were willing to act in accordance with their special 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ 
(Wheeler 2001, p. 119). 
However the debate among the EU member states over the question of the 
binding UN mandate was far from over. As for the ESS, which was drawn up 
in the wake of the Iraq crisis, it was disapproved that the strategy had not 
expressly stated that, in principle, the EU should look for a UN mandate for 
coercive military action. It entails that the ESS can be understood as consenting 
to/or permitting a Kosovo scenario. State behaviour shows that all of the 
member states are prepared to make use of force, if necessary. Some have a 
more evident habit of going for interventions than others. However, no one 
considers employing force as a primary means and all favour doing so with a 
UN mandate (Biscop and Drieskens 2005, p. 2). The mandate was influential in 
attracting the participation of the EU states in military operations to the point 
that a UN mandate had been ‘produced’, in 2003, by the High Representative 
for Foreign and Security Policy (HR) Solana to give ambassadors the specific 
arguments that would convince Germany to reverse its refusal to participate in 
operation Artemis (Meyer 2006, p. 134). 
Critical to the EU demanding and obtaining a UN mandate was the fact that the 
EU had no opportunity to speak its voice directly at the UN Security Council 
(UNSC).[8] It had this prospect when the EU presidency was held by either 
France or Britain, the EU states permanent members of the UNSC, or by a 
European state that was holding an elected two-year seat. Article J.5 of the 
Treaty of Maastricht states that: 
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council 
will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States 
which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in execution of their 
functions, ensure the defence of the positions and interests of the Union, without 
prejudice to their responsibilities under the provision of the United Nations 
Charter. 
This declaration was kept unchanged in the Treaty of Amsterdam, though the 
pertinent article is featured as J.9.[9] Critical to the growth and functioning of 
the ESDP/CSDP was the fact that France and Britain considered their UN 
standing as representing a higher calling and would not be compelled, even by 
existing commitments to common European positions. They managed to 
maintain their freedom of manoeuvre at the UNSC through the formulation and 
passing of the treaties, though they were not opposed to consulting, informing 
and coordinating with their EU partners. The EU partners were in a way taken 
hostage by France and Britain and their particular interests and policy, and 
were driven into the choice ‘between silent dependency and public opposition 
to their ‘‘representatives’’ ’ (Hill 2005, p. 32, 35). However, the whole of this 
was a paradox because the Security Council was supposed to be the UN forum 
where the European Union was powerful and influential, by way of two 
permanent members and admission to the non- permanent seats (Gowan and 
Brantner 2008, p. 47). 
In 2008, when the UN Secretary General demanded European military support 
for MUNUC in the Congo, France represented the EU at the Security Council 
where it could speak the European voice, by virtue of its chairing the European 
Council presidency for the semester ending in December. It therefore 
concentrated some influence that could be used to promote European policy. 
If the UNSC’s mandate was significant to enable EU states to give their 
consent to EU military missions, the ‘system’ of the EU connecting its official 
acts to the UN was also relevant. It contributed to creating consensus among 
the EU states on the progress of a policy in the security and crisis management 
area that foresaw the promotion of a more military self-reliant EU.[10] 
Community of views was necessary for signing the legal documents for the 
establishment of the rapid reaction force. Underwriting agreements where the 
use of the military was foreseen in connection with a common operation with 
the UN was less committing to the EU states in terms of ratifying the 
agreement in their national parliament. The link to the UN also emphasised 
ethical causes such as the R2P people and humanitarian issues contained in the 
HG 2010, to contribute to convincing the domestic arena of the value of the 
national military commitment. Thus, there is a sense of ambiguity in all this. 
Counter-arguments suggest that the rhetoric and pledges in the official acts 
responded to the need for building up the identity of the EU. Consequently they 
are justified by the idealistic task of shaping the ‘self’ of the Union. These 
opposed views claim that if the EU appears unable to act along the line which 
is promising to follow, it doesn’t necessarily have to stop talking.[11] This 
paper contends, instead, that such a rhetoric was a useful remedy against the 
Union’s internal divisions on the radical military plans of the EU/ESDP and 
made the innovative programmes more palatable to the EU partners. The extent 
of ambiguity played on by the EU/member states could thus be seen in this 
practice of linking the official acts to the UN, which was in reality intended to 
create agreement among the EU states on the progress of the ESDP/CSDP 
policy in the crisis management area that contemplated the deployment of the 
military on its own. 
A possible action 
The UN call 
Agreeing on modernising the EU’s rapid reaction force was not enough with 
regard to the tasks claimed by the HG 2010. The ambition of being able to 
decide to launch an operation within five days of the approval of the Crisis 
Management Concept by the European Council, and to deploy battlegroup 
units of 1500 troops no later than ten days after was something exceptional for 
the Union. Presumably, action had to follow for the simple reason that the EU 
ought to deliver on its agenda. 
The narrative on the UN’s call for European support makes clear that, in 
October 2008, the peacekeeping force of the UN MONUC mission in the DRC 
was coming under severe strain in Goma, in the province of North Kivu, the 
country’s eastern region. The Security Council (21 October) ‘condemn[ed] all 
attacks [...] launched against MONUC in the past days’ (SC 2008). The 
Council was briefed (28 October) in private consultations by the Under 
Secretary General for Peacekeeping Opera- tions (Alain Le Roy), and 
discussed the possible options for employing a multi- national force to make 
Goma safer (SCr 2008). 
A letter from the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon to HR Solana asked the 
EU to dispatch military support for the MONUC UN mission with a bridging 
operation, while awaiting reinforcements of 17,000�20,000 men (IAI 
2008).[12] The needed troops amounted to the precise number of forces 
theoretically available by the European scheduled stand-by BGs. The letter 
used at least three different expressions to stress that ‘the UN had no one else 
to turn to for well-equipped peacekeepers that could be quickly dispatched’; 
that is, a EU-led force would provide a ‘necessary complement’ to MONUC, 
an ‘essential bridging arrangement’ until the arrival of MONUC 
reinforcements, and a ‘critical complement’ to ongoing efforts (EV 2008). 
The European efforts were to provide humanitarian assistance for thousands of 
refugees displaced by fighting around the city of Goma. Together with 
protecting civilians in danger, the objectives of the European contribution were 
to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and protect UN personnel, 
facilities, installations and equipment (Deutsche Welle 2008a). A European 
action would have been coherent with the emphasis on the rapid response 
reinforcing the EU’s ability to answer possible UN requests (HG 2010). 
The chairman of the Military Committee (EUMC, General Henri Bentegeat, 
November 2008) declared that, in theory, the EU could deploy a BG to Goma 
but that such an action demanded the agreement of all member states in the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council. Two battlegroups were on call 
at that time, one was British and the other a German-led BG. Together, they 
amounted to some 3000 troops, deployable at 15 days’ notice. In Brussels, the 
situation in the Congo was debated in GAERC (10 November) in relation to the 
UN’s call for extra troops. However, it was decided that no BG would be 
deployed to the DRC (IAI). How was the European negative response built 
around the UN Secretary General’s demand for a EU military contribution? 
A closer look at the positions in GAERC? 
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) was the formal 
decision-making body in the area of ESDP/CSDP and the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. It was composed of the national foreign ministers and for 
strategic questions by the European Council made up of the heads of state. At 
the GAERC meeting, when the decision for the EU BG’s non-intervention was 
taken, HR Solana introduced four military options to the member states. 
Together with HR Solana, as holder of the presidency, France was in the 
position of playing a role in trying to promote a European policy along the line 
of the expectations of the UN Secretary General. It would have had in 
particular to commit itself at the PSC level, where the tasks of talking about 
national proposals, revising others’ ideas and synthesising a view to present at 
GAERC were pursued. It had already done this within the PSC (in 2003 and 
2006, and recently in 2009) to the purpose of drawing together deployable 
European forces for crisis management. Now it must have been aware of the 
possible willingness of member states to contribute their troops, and thereby 
lift the burden from MONUC. 
When Solana presented the military options, member states questioned the 
feasibility of deployment. On the one hand they questioned the fact that the 
Secretary General had demanded a force slightly larger than a battlegroup, and 
on the other they disputed the necessity of a separate EU force beside the UN 
operation on the ground (in Menon 2009, p. 232 [13]). 
Britain, provider of a stand-by BG, had its position highlighted by the foreign 
secretary, David Miliband, declaring that ‘no one [was] ruling out a military 
role’ for the EU (Deutsche Welle 2008a), a statement that contrasted with his 
other focus on the deployment of MONUC forces (HoC/1 2008). Domestically, 
Miliband was accused of being ‘against an EU force’, when ‘France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands said that they were prepared to send forces, and that an EU 
deployment was possible under the lead nation concept’ (HoC/2 2008). 
Germany, the other BG provider, also questioned the idea of a EU force with 
its reservations accentuated by the foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 
calling for Rwanda to help the DRC and the development minister, Heidemarie 
Wieczorek- Zeul, contending that she couldn’t assess whether a German 
contribution was useful to build peace, or whether a special EU contingent was 
fundamental to this scope (Deutsche Welle 2008b; GFO 2008). 
France initially favoured deployment. In early October, when the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General to the DRC (Alan Doss from 
Britain) raised the request for temporary additional troops for MONUC, France 
had been sympathetic to his call (SCr 2008). France was a convinced supporter 
of the responsibility to protect people (TG 2008), and it was the initiator of the 
development of the rapid reaction force within the EU. However, France later 
showed itself sceptical about deployment of forces, with foreign minister 
Bernard Kouchner using the term ‘theoretically’ (as General Bentegeat had 
done) to indicate the existence of battlegroups, and arguing that the presence of 
emergency mechanisms in the EU should not lead to the assumption that the 
Europeans were automatically going to send troops alongside MONUC (AF 
2008). Britain, Germany and France shared the view that the Europeans 
envisaged a political- diplomatic approach as a solution to the crisis and as 
their answer to the UN request (AF 2008, Deutsche Welle 2008a).[14] 
Trying to figure out some national stances in GAERC, Belgium was one of the 
most vocal EU states expressing interest in European deployment. Belgium 
was scheduled to lead the EU BG with France in the second semester of 2009; 
nonetheless, in December 2008 it was ready to send 500 troops to the Congo 
(IAI 2008). As for the Netherlands, the minister of development cooperation 
(Koenders) had just returned from a visit to eastern Congo in mid-December. 
The DRC was a pre-modern, frail state in which the government no longer held 
the monopoly over the use of force. The Dutch minister said that he was 
accepting the challenging request made by the former UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, that ‘unless we take our responsibility for fragile states, the world 
cannot enjoy peace and prosperity’, and he had spoken of the potential of the 
Dutch armed forces. He had planned to concentrate on the ‘judicious’ 
deployment of military instruments. The Netherlands had not objected to the 
deployment of forces (DMD 2008). 
As for Sweden, though the Nordic battlegroup (NBG) led by Sweden had just 
terminated its six-month stand-by rotation, Sweden seemed ready to activate it 
and to deploy it in the DRC. It might be argued that the Swedish experience 
with the rapid reaction force of the kind of the BG had been extremely costly, 
implying that much of the Swedish enthusiasm for the concept was 
considerably undermined. The pros and cons in this regard are explained in 
detail in Jacoby and Jones’s analysis (2008) and by Andersson’s views (2008). 
However, a speech delivered on 19 September 2008 in Helsinki by Carl Bildt, 
Sweden’s Foreign Minister at the time, sheds some light on his thinking about 
the battlegroup’s action: 
At some point in time we must review the Headline Goals from 1999 as well as the 
more recent Battlegroup concept. The French Presidency has recently submitted 
some interesting thoughts regarding this. But in the meantime we should discuss 
how we can use these forces when they are not used. Why can’t we – just to 
mention an example – as a routine deploy the EU Battle group to different areas of 
interest to us. This will test their deployment ability – and will demonstrate what 
we are able to do. I’m certain it will be seen as more meaningful by the forces 
themselves than just waiting somewhere for nothing to happen.[15] 
Our presumed Swedish readiness to activate its BG was, however, a possibility 
that contrasted with Britain’s refusal to provide the services of its Permanent 
Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood as an operational HQ (Gowan 2009, 
p. 58). This was a facility that the Scandinavians lacked. It was estimated that 
the strength of the Nordic battlegroup in the first half of 2008 was just less than 
3000 troops, with some 2300 officers contributed by Sweden, 200 by Finland, 
and 150 troops by Norway, some 80 soldiers by Ireland and 50 troops by 
Estonia. On top of that, the NBG had received training with a specific 
international focus tasked at ‘readying soldiers’ for deployment, mobility and 
flexibility (Jacoby and Jones 2008, pp. 326-327, 330). Hence, the battlegroup 
being reasonably ‘waiting for action’, as is considered to be the case here, the 
question would be ‘fit for what?’ 
The key point at this time would suggest the existence of some influence (by 
some EU member states): in spite of the availability of forces and the supposed 
keenness to deploy them, the resultant European common policy was inaction. 
The ambiguity of non-deployment lay in the denial of using resources that were 
theoretically available to intervene militarily. The ambivalence of the 
EU/member states of equipping themselves with the rapid reaction capability 
and not offering the ‘necessary complement’ to MONUC with an ‘essential 
bridging arrangement’ was apparent. In terms of disposition to deploy, in 2008 
the ‘critical complement’ to the UN/ MONUC ongoing efforts did not amount 
to such a strong motivation behind deployment as there had been for Artemis, 
which had moved France and the other member states to be active. There was 
no high politics to play by showing the USA that the EU was still capable of 
agreeing and, in particular, on the novel policy of deploying forces as there had 
been in 2003. 
Even the EU-Africa policy and its evolution that the member states had 
supported (with the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in Lisbon in 
December 2007 and the first Action Plan (2008-10) soon afterwards (Franke 
2009, p. 70, Vervaeke 2009, p. 75), although highly significant, had not moved 
the member states to take action. The action plan focused on how to ‘enhance 
dialogue on challenges to peace and security’ (p. 32) within the priority activity 
being included on its agenda. It underscored the plan of ‘undertak[ing] joint 
assessment missions to conflict and post conflict areas, and launch[ing] joint 
initiatives when appropriate’ (p. 33) (JAEUS 2007). These endorsed 
programmes had not pressed the EU member states to take action. It resulted in 
this in spite of the fact that the action plan on peace and security included 
civilian and military crisis management and was aimed at coordinating support 
for the African Standby Force (ASF). This was the conclusion, even though, in 
the DRC, the member states and the EU, through Eusec DRC, were providing 
advice and support for army integration and the development of a rapid 
reaction force. Thus, it was true that EU support for the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA) remained highly fragmented. The main reason 
was that EU member states were content with their bilateral programmes as 
France, Germany, the UK and Italy also appeared to be (Vines 2010, p. 
1106).[16] A vision of the EU, supported by more than one observer, is that its 
political relations with its meaningful regional partners (i.e. the AU within the 
context of ‘strategic partner- ships’) as well as its emphasis on conflict 
prevention and resolution policy were more a manifestation of its desire to 
enhance its global ambitions rather than reflecting a true concern for the 
African countries, exacerbated by wars (Olsen 2002, Gegout 2005, Duke 2008, 
Bendiek and Kramer 2010, p. 456). 
Together with highlighting these limitations, the GAERC insight also gave a 
sign of ambiguity inherent in the EU battlegroup concept itself: Belgium which 
had colonial ties with the DRC was, in GAERC, one of the most vocal 
contributors of troops in support of a European operation. Britain and France 
had also previously shown that they had national interests to defend, with their 
respective interventions in 2000 and 2002 in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, 
which created the basis of the BG concept. For instance, in 2000 the external 
exports of Sierra Leone to Britain amounted to 35 per cent of the country’s 
total, and in 2002 the external exports of the Ivory Coast to France amounted to 
13 per cent of the country’s total exports (UN comtrade 2009). There were 
particular relations to protect with the military interventions. Hence, the EU’s 
ambiguity rests on having promoted a policy, the battlegroup concept that was 
functional to those EU member states that had particular legacies with African 
countries with which they shared some traditions of colonial heritage. 
Seeking to understand how the European negative response was arrived at to 
the request ‘for well equipped peacekeepers that could be quickly dispatched’, 
the ‘lead nation concept’ gave the possible indication that leaving that role to 
EU states other than Britain, Germany and France could prove too demanding. 
With no motivation for Britain and Germany, provider of the EU BGs, and 
with the reluctant declaration of France, the other EU states either believed it 
prudent to steer away or they were denied initiative. 
Was the EU obliged to deploy? 
It could be argued that the EU was not obliged to deploy its battlegroups, to 
comply with UN’s requests, or to support its causes. The decision to provide 
military capabilities to a UN operation was a national responsibility, and 
‘[m]ilitary capabilities [were] in no way ‘‘frozen’’ for ESDP purposes’ 
(EU/UN/co 2004, paragr. 4). In addition, not intervening in a situation that was 
confused by Rwandan complicity could be judged a better option. Also the 
view that ‘the formal request by the UN arrived too late’ and could not build 
that impact on EU politics that it hoped to create was a justification that was 
aired against deployment (Vines 2010, p. 1101). 
Further arguments emphasised by those opposing the battlegroup’s action were 
the involvement of the EU in a number of initiatives, already channelling funds 
to the DRC through the African Peace Facility (APF), and of the ESDP in 
supporting the AU’s peacekeeping capacity building. The EU had tried to 
address the African continent by engaging in partnership with the AU (Knutsen 
2009, p. 444). The AU had been structured similarly to the EU, and full-time 
representatives have been exchanged. There was continuous political dialogue 
between the PSC in Brussels and the AU Peace and Security Council within the 
EU-AU peace and security partnership. The EU has increased its support for 
African capacity by appointing, at the beginning of 2008, a special adviser on 
African peacekeeping capabilities (General Joana). The ESDP offered 
capacity-building at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa by making available a 
team of military advisers based in the European Commission delegation to 
Ethiopia. These were part of the EU delegation to the AU, under the EU 
Special Representative for the AU and Head of the European delegation to the 
EU, the Belgian Koen Vervaeke (Vines 2010, pp. 1092-1093). The EU was 
going to broaden the scope of AFP for the period between 2008-13 to include 
conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. The European Commis- sion 
announced emergency financial aid of 4 million euros, and another 12 million 
euros were allocated specifically to helping the population in the eastern Congo 
(Deutsche Welle 2008b). The EU financial support was given to the AU-led 
peacekeeping operations via the APF (Hardt 2009, p. 393). Within the 
European Union, both France and Belgium have been the most actively 
engaged in maintaining the DRC and the broader region on the EU agenda. 
Belgium led the international efforts towards security sector reform and had 
been joined by the Netherlands and the UK (Hoebeke et al. 2007, pp. 12-13). 
Especially in relation to the R2P task embraced by the EU, there were many 
other humanitarian causes needing support in addition to the Congo. The EU 
could not commit itself to all of them. Some argued that the Union could not be 
confused with an ‘agent’ pursuing humanitarian tasks, and that the EU needed 
to be sure that its actions reflected the European common interest with regard 
to security and linked its operations to the capabilities, both existing and 
projected.[17] 
Others pointed out that up to the mid-2008, there was a concentration of EU/ 
ESDP operations in the Congo: Artemis (2003) with 1800 troops, Eufor RD 
(2006) with 2000 personnel, the limited police training effort Eupol, in 
Kinshasa (2005) with 30 people, substituted by a new mission to the country as 
a whole (2007), and a continuing security sector reform operation, Eusec RD 
(2005) with 40 officers. They contended that 5 out of the 20 EU/ESDP 
operations having taken place in the DRC were a sign that the EU/member 
states needed to decide what their priorities were (Witney 2008, pp. 40-42). 
There were various counter-arguments supporting the option of not intervening 
in the Congo. 
Difficulties and obstacles informing the national stances of Britain and 
Germany regarding the BGs deployment in the DRC in 2008? 
Why had those EU states that were in charge of deploying not done so, after all 
the declarations, and readiness for contributing to UN’s efforts they subscribed 
to? The declarations made above by the EU states’ policy-makers led to the 
realisation that there were uncertainties with regard to the use of their forces. 
The BGs deployment required not only the consensus of the 27 member states 
but also a firm commitment from the lead nation in each BG (EV 2008). Here 
we focus on the difficulties and obstacles that informed the national stances of 
Britain and Germany in relation to deployment in the Congo, and then focus on 
the main cause for Britain’s and Germany’s non-deployment and for inaction in 
late 2008. 
The British position 
Capabilities? 
A common discourse in the UK was that: ‘our determination to have a 
dispropor- tionate influence in the world means that we have persistently 
outspent what we can afford’. Britain was one of the few EU states that spent 
over the 2 per cent of the GDP for defence, and which had ultimately increased 
it again (Hill 2010, p. 13). The main concern confronting the UK and, in 
particular, ‘in the battlegroup initiative’ (Witney 2008, p. 5) was in terms of 
capabilities. 
However there was a major problem: the military component of the UK 
defence policy was starting to look rather weak, and there was a debate within 
the British defence establishment on the direction defence should take in terms 
of strategy (and expenses and development). There was uncertainty on the role 
of the military and the future for western armies, whether it be one of 
stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) or 
one following the contention that old conventional state-versus-state clashes 
could or would comeback again.[18] This was a specific structural period for 
the UK for its revision of the Strategic Defence Review, and this ongoing 
debate and exercise did influence the outlook. The British army continued 
divided on this question, because it was unthinkable that two kinds of military 
structure, intensity of operations and level of resources could be sustained 
(Cornish and Dorman 2009, p. 255). 
Funds for capabilities are scarce now, were scarce in 2008, and inadequate to 
meet the ambitions and needs of the EU for the roles laid out in the ESS 
(Chatham 2008, p. 21). Investment shortfalls in capabilities critical for EU 
BGs’ missions included helicopters, intelligence and reconnaissance, 
equipment for air-to-air refuelling (Witney 2008, p. 5) and infantry available 
for operations. Transport costs were significant. Availability of transport to 
move battlegroups was a problem. Only four C-17s were available to the EU, 
all in the UK. Despite current projects such as the Airbus M-400, 
approximately 200 C-130 flights would be needed to transfer a BG (Jacoby and 
Jones 2008, p. 331).[19] Comments from foreign affairs elite circles put 
emphasis on the fact that divergences in national EU military capabilities 
‘could leave [such] countries as Britain carrying an unacceptable proportion of 
the military burden and public expenditure costs of European security’ 
(Chatham 2008, p. 22). 
Political will? 
Britain’s reluctance to deploy a BG was compounded by other reasons. A 
senior British military chief made explicit that a further deployment, even one 
lasting only six months, would place serious strain on the Ministry of Defence 
(politics.co.uk 2008). The view that the British BG was on standby on paper 
but that troops were actually resting between deployments to Iraq and 
Afghanistan was aired in Brussels among EU officials (EV 2008, Menon 2009, 
p. 236). British officials stressed a tough limitation of the possible European 
mission by questioning how any EU force would work with UN forces, as they 
have seen in other theatres that parallel forces with different command 
structures often caused complexities (politics.co.uk 2008; see Major 2008, pp. 
27-28, 30-31, 35, Tardy 2009). 
In terms of firm commitment from the lead nation in each BG, London was not 
only lukewarm, it was unwilling for intervention. In spite of Sweden pressing 
for action and offering forces and leadership, Britain appeared to have blocked 
deployment (Gowan 2009, p. 58). Britain’s choice was for inaction. 
 
The German position 
Economic constraint, capabilities, troop availability and political concern? 
The principal argument for Germany underpinning the idea of battlegroup non- 
deployment was economic constraint. Just after the UN’s call, Chancellor 
Merkel put the accent on this question saying that 2009 was ‘a year which 
began with the painful realisation that we are in the grips of the most severe 
economic crisis for decades, triggered off by an international crisis on the 
financial markets’ (MSC 2009). This discourse reinforced the claim already 
made in 2006 by Defence Minister Jung at the time of the Eufor DR Congo 
mission, that the lack of financial resources to fund the increasing scope of the 
Bundeswehr’s deployment across the globe was limiting its action (Die Welt 
2006). There was no adequate financial basis for involvement in late 2008. 
Also for Germany there was the question of capability. Speaking at the Munich 
Security Conference (2009), the Chancellor laid emphasis on the fact that there 
have been dreadful and alarming events in Africa, and that ‘we have adopted 
the concept of battle groups, but when it comes to putting this into practice we 
still have a long way to go’. And showing concern for means and resources 
available to rapid deployment, Merkel warned that ‘the European Security and 
Defence Policy’s military capabilities [were] not adequately pooled’ (MSC 
2009). The German military capabilities were in the process of being upgraded. 
The commitments contained in the 2003, 2004 and 2006 federal security 
documents (Verteidigungspo- litische Richtlinien [VPR], Konzeption der 
Bundeswehr and Weibbuch) revealed the German recognition of the need to 
acquire an expeditionary capability with high- intensity warfare capabilities 
(Sperling 2009, p. 144). German Defence Minister Karl- Theodor zu 
Guttenberg relaunched the call made by the Chancellor on pooling resources, 
and re-proposed the idea, while addressing the IISS in London (2010), of 
improving the division of labour among European allies as a system to 
diminish budget pressure. European governments invested little money 
together, and persist in spending on their national supplier bases, producing 
costly duplications. The European Defence Agency (EDA) contends (2010) 
that ‘pooling and sharing’ can offer more attractive answers to the challenge of 
meeting European capability requirements in a constrained economic 
environment (Giegerich 2010, p. 88, 92). 
Availability of troops was questionable. There had been and there were 
shortfalls: the Bundeswehr was reaching the limit of troops available for 
international crisis management (Die Welt 2006). Uncertainty about the end-
date of the European mission in the DRC contributed to making this question 
more open to debate within the German federal defence establishment. It was 
not clear exactly when UN reinforcement for the MONUC force was expected 
to arrive thus concluding the essential bridging action requested by the UN 
Secretary General. The situation on the ground could deteriorate and could lead 
to a request for a strategic reserve. The exit strategy was foreseen by the 2004 
EU-UN Joint Declaration (EU/UN/co 2004, paragr. 10), but the Europeans had 
not agreed on the legal procedures in this respect such as ‘how’ the change of 
employment of the BG should occur (EU/Unr 2005). The BG’s operation in the 
theatre could threaten to last longer than anticipated, as was the case in 2009, in 
Chad, when the Swedish force extended its action (Jacoby and Jones 2008, p. 
328). If extending the presence of the EU BG was necessary, somebody had to 
ensure the availability of soldiers (Scheuermann 2010, p. 25). These were 
strong national caveats. 
A further caveat was related to the point that the battlegroup deployment could 
be stalled by the national parliament, whose ratification was required by the 
German constitution (IT 2008). The federal elections were not far away; in 
September 2009, the Germans had to elect the members of the Bundestag and 
domestic reactions to deployment of forces and to Germany’s involvement in a 
further operation were factors that Chancellor Merkel supposedly sought 
prudently to avoid.[20] 
Strategic planning 
Germany raised as an objection the lack of strategic planning of the 
EU/member states’ security and defence operations. This was another reason 
for not endorsing the force deployment in the Congo. It claimed that there were 
deficiencies in preparing these missions adequately, in following them up 
carefully on their execution, in drawing on all the EU’s resources and in 
adapting plans and operations to changing circumstances (Asseburg and 
Kempin 2009, p. 158). A UN report of July 2008 remarked that EU’s 
interventions addressed ‘only the consequence, and not the issues underlying 
the conflict’. This criticism was applied to the situation in Chad, but it 
suggested a more general inability of EU missions to resolve problems on the 
ground (UNr 2008). 
There were initiatives already in the DRC contributing to rebuild the state 
structures and to approach issues underlying local conflicts (Eupol Kinshasa, 
Eupol RD Congo, Eusec as seen above) (Piccolino 2010, p. 128), but the BG’s 
focus on short-term military solutions was not combined with a long-term 
political vision (Koepf 2010, pp. 13-14). Germany wanted to make sure that 
military means, if considered useful, as well as diplomatic means were 
combined into an all-inclusive conflict management approach. Integrating the 
battlegroup’s deployment into comprehensive conflict management strategies 
was the vision of Germany (Asseburg and Kempin 2009, p. 158).[21] 
Priorities 
Last, but not least there was the question that the Sub-Saharan region of Africa 
was not an immediate priority for Germany’s foreign, security and defence 
policy. The Ministry of Defence (2010) focused on the primary goals of 
German security policy as being to strengthen European stability in the areas of 
the EU’s neighbourhood, the states of eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus, 
and Central Asia and the Mediterranean region; the Sub-Saharan region of 
Africa was not mentioned among the MoD’s priorities (FMD 2010). However, 
Germany was willing to support the UN in specific and limited situations, but it 
was unwilling to be militarily engaged in African peacekeeping missions 
‘without any vital interest’ (Scheuermann 2010, p. 25), confirming the true of 
Germany’s priorities. The fact that the UN’s request related to Africa 
contributed to Germany’s lack of enthusiasm to send supporting troops 
(Chappel 2009, p. 435). 
The suspicion that the EU BG acted in the interest of a few member states 
(Asseburg and Kempin 2009, p. 159) was lessening Germany’s keenness for 
participation and commitment to the mission. It was noteworthy that France 
over- contributed to missions to Africa (Sperling 2009, p. 132). These 
engagements were better to be actively supported by a sufficiently large 
number of EU states, rather than just being tolerated (Asseburg and Kempin 
2009, p. 159). Germany was concerned that by participating in the Eufor RD 
Congo in 2006 it had served French national foreign policy conducted within 
the EU framework. That kind of scepticism was still driving Germany’s 
reaction (Gross 2009, Koepf 2010, Tull 2010) to undertaking the EU mission in 
2008. It was useful to decide which priority deserved the prompt commitment 
of the EU’s crisis management intervention. In this way the EU states could be 
clearer on ‘when’ their willingness to participate, pool resources and deploy 
forces were going to be most vital, also with regard to acting for the UN. 
In the end, the prospect of Germany being drawn into too many European 
deployments without a clear vision for such deployments was looming as a 
failure (Miskimmon 2006) of its foreign, security and defence policy. 
Arguably, German deployments mirrored a ‘culture of prudence’, aimed at 
minimising costs and limiting deployments to those areas of the world 
encroaching unequivocally upon German interests (Sperling 2009, p. 144). 
Britain’s and Germany’s non-deployment 
How do we interpret these findings? Financial restrictions, shortage of troops, 
unavailability of equipment as well as revision of national security strategies 
were serious concerns. Were these really the obstacles to BG deployment? 
There are always difficulties vis-a`-vis the challenging task of making use of 
the military, of bridging other operations and cooperating with soldiers with 
different training. Also deployment is not beneficial in the sense of obtaining 
direct repayment for that action. We remarked that an important aspect of 
capabilities is the willingness of offering forces. Referring to other experiences 
beyond the case of the DRC in 2008, obstacles to the rapid deployment of 
battlegroups were capabilities, force generation and, in particular, political will 
(Giegerich 2008, p. 27). Since 2007, member states have been making two BGs 
available on a rotational basis and none of them was dispatched. The three 
above-mentioned obstacles emerged as being problematic in Artemis and 
Eufor, the two military deployments undertaken and completed autonomously 
by the EU, and also characterised the shortfalls of the more recent armed 
deployment to eastern Chad and to the north-eastern part of the Central African 
Republic. In the latter case, capability was at the core of the stalemate with the 
failure to locate helicopters and transport aircrafts (Witney 2008, p. 43). Force 
generation took time (with the UNSC authorising the operation in September 
2007, the mission becoming a ESDP action in January, and actual operational 
capacity being achieved in mid-March). Reluctance to participate and respond 
to the UN request played a part in affecting (i.e. delaying) the mission (Jacoby 
and Jones 2008, p. 327). So there are problems conflicting with the ‘rapid’ 
deployment. Vines saw a deficit in the UN Secretary General’s request arriving 
too late to create an impact on European politics. This could be true 
considering that force generation takes time, and also that the Europeans were 
concentrating their military efforts on other actions. 
However, we detect two points here at the conclusion of the reflection on the 
difficulties and obstacles that informed the national stances of Britain and 
Germany concerning battlegroup non-deployment in the DRC. One point is 
about the non- deployment of the battlegroup itself. The other focuses on what 
we envisage as the ultimate cause behind Britain’s and Germany’s non-
deployment, beyond the hindrances that we have highlighted. 
First, the factors that we claimed as barrier to rapid deployment (capabilities, 
force generation and political will) intertwine their damaging effects within an 
operation, with deficits in capabilities endangering force-generation. The two 
together sidetrack political will. The view of these shortfalls considered within 
the system of the rapid deployment of the BG force offers the prospect of 
inaction. This point agrees with the assessment advanced by observers of the 
underperformance of the battlegroup system (Major 2008, Gowan 2009, p. 56). 
Some even objected that in the EU BG, institutional design problems of 
bureaucratic dysfunction obstruct the capacity to rapidly take action (Hardt 
2009, p. 1). However this discussion is beyond the remit of this paper. 
Second, beyond the factors argued here as militating against deployment, how 
do we perceive the principal motivation for non-deployment, and where does 
the ambiguity enunciated in this paper’s hypothesis lie? Britain’s and 
Germany’s political unwillingness to use forces was central to a lack of action 
in the DRC. Their preoccupations in late 2008 with capability (i.e. funds, 
equipment and strategic planning) and availability of troops were good 
pretexts. Their arguments were well placed to reach consensus within the EU-
27 and make legitimate their disinclination to deploy. Here lies the ambiguity. 
Britain’s assertion that ‘battlegroups were not designed for that kind of 
operation’ (politics.co.uk 2008) may not have convinced some, but possibly 
convinced others. Britain and Germany were scheduled as BG providers and 
that role emerged as holding unconditional power, control and influence over 
an inoperative military. Their pretexts had put aside the tasks the EU/ member 
states fixed with the HG 2010, their commitment to R2P (which the BGs 
operations were thought of as playing a part), and their determination to 
contribute to UN’s requests for support in its efforts ‘to restore international 
peace and security’. Though Britain and Germany, the two BGs providers, 
adduced a number of very good reasons and justifications for non-deployment, 
their lack of political willingness to deploy was the main cause for inaction in 
late 2008. 
Conclusions 
The danger of any case study based upon a single case is that it is problematic 
to arrive at definite conclusions of the kind that a comparative analysis might 
produce. Thus, the insights from this paper do help to draw together some 
observations, but we are conscious that we cannot draw firm conclusions. 
In a case that is not dissimilar from the present DRC at the end of 2008, i.e. 
that of Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003, the EU/member states chose 
action. On the one hand, it seems that the Europeans have responded to the 
United Nations’ direct demand for support issued by Kofi Annan, have reached 
agreement among the member states on joint action, and thus have deepened 
integration and have enhanced the EU’s military crisis management policy in 
Africa. The EU/member states respected the norms, rules and policies. 
On the other hand, Annan ‘connecting’ with Paris leads to France, to its prime 
involvement as a framework nation, to its provision of the HQ, and to its 
conducting of the operational planning, which involved officers from more 
than ten countries. Together with demonstrating its ability to multinationalise a 
national Permanent Joint Headquarters, France led a battalion formed by a 
majority of its own national troops with a rapid force projection far away from 
Europe. Artemis was the direct manifestation of the EU/member states’ 
capacity to act militarily independently from NATO/US assets. It was a sign of 
a novel policy and expression of European extreme efforts in agreeing on this 
radical position. In addition, the Democratic Republic of Congo was one of the 
nations of France’s (former) colonial ‘entourage’. Artemis was a French 
operation. It could not be a ‘model’ operation in 2008. In terms of the 
‘disposition to deploy’, the critical components that underlay Operation 
Artemis, which moved France and the other member states, were not present in 
2008. As deduced from this paper, the (external, political, financial and 
strategic) circum- stances were different in 2008. The common foreign and 
defence policy had grown and a number of military missions had been 
undertaken, including a maritime military mission, and European experience 
gained in this field of policies. The Artemis pattern of behaviour (with the 
battlegroup’s focus on short-term solutions) contrasted with the ‘joint 
ownership’ pattern (as declared in the official documents and long-term 
political vision) of the EU’s involvement in operations in Africa to back and 
support the African Union’s involvement in Africa’s peacekeeping. According 
to its rhetoric, the EU cared about its political relations with its most 
meaningful regional partners, the AU, within the context of ‘strategic 
partnerships’ or within regional oriented ‘strategies’ (Bendiek and Kramer 
2010, pp. 455�456). It must be decided whether this label of aired connected 
policies, guided by priorities and interests, was always justified, or whether the 
EU was exaggerating the use of the ‘strategy’ language. 
This paper aims to show that the case of non-deployment of European 
battlegroups in the DRC at the end of 2008 constitutes a useful case study for 
detecting a number of ambiguities of the EU in respect of its declarations in the 
official documents establishing the European military crisis management 
interven- tion structure. The ambiguities have been discussed in some detail. 
The basis of the contradictions inherent in the inaction in late 2008 lies in the 
fact that the military crisis management policy is led by the member states’ 
national interests, concerns and reluctance to deploy forces. This is not 
particularly new, the ESDP being intergovernmental in nature. Ultimately, with 
any decision to commit and employ military forces, we are dealing with 
sovereign decisions and, within the European Union, with two main 
contributors (France and the UK). The three tasks set out in the introduction to 
this paper have highlighted ambivalent positions within European policy, 
despite the fact that the United Nations Charter and Chapter VII and the UN’s 
efforts to restore international peace are included by the EU and member states 
within the framework for military crisis management operations to establish the 
idea of European support. 
The EU’s practice of ‘linking’ official acts to the UN was in reality intended to 
contribute to creating agreement among the EU states on the progress of the 
ESDP/ CSDP policy in the crisis management area that contemplated the 
deployment of the military on its own (this paper’s first task). 
The way in which the European negative response to the UN’s request for 
BG’s deployment was built suggests that the ‘lead nation concept’ gave 
indications that leaving that role to EU states other than France, Germany and 
Britain, could prove too demanding (the second task). The paper has also found 
that the BG concept was functional to those EU member states that had 
particular legacies with African countries with which they shared some 
traditions of colonial heritage. 
Though Britain and Germany, the two BGs providers, adduced a number of 
very good reasons and justifications for non-deployment, their lack of political 
willingness to deploy was the main cause for inaction in late 2008 (the third 
task). 
Overall, the findings of this paper are discouraging in drawing attention to the 
emergence of contradictions within the EU, and not least the apparent 
relegation of the UN to an appendix of EU policy. The problem is not that the 
battlegroup missed an opportunity for deployment. The BG concept was flawed 
from the outset, and this also provided the main rationale behind the reticence 
actually to use it. The central issue is that if political willingness to commit 
troops is not behind the instruments that are made available by the CSDP, the 
EU’s military crisis manage- ment policy will continue to suggest a sense of 
ambiguity. It would damage the EU if member states’ reluctance leads the 
European Union to fail challenging responsibilities. 
However what are these conclusions supposed to suggest? The contrast with 
the ‘relegation’ of the UN as an appendix of EU policy is given by the 
coordination efforts within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Enormous efforts are devoted to presenting a united front, supporting EU 
common positions and debating and defending European stances at the 
Security Council at the invitation of the permanent members. These are 
significant windows of opportunity to combat the discouraging vision of the 
contradictions that emerged in this paper. 
This case study is developed in the pre-Lisbon institutional, structural, 
diplomatic and cultural environment. Has the ‘milieu’ now fundamentally 
changed under the new procedures introduced by the Lisbon Treaty? The 
European External Action Service (EEAS) will assist the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
Commission in charge of external relations, but it will be seen also at that level 
whether infighting (inside and outside the Union), disarray and the lack of a 
strategic vision will be major factors impacting on delaying or inhibiting the 
coordination efforts (Missiroli 2010, p. 4). As far as the EU’s regional African 
partner is concerned (the AU), the function of the double-credited EU special 
representative for the AU and Head of the European Commission Delegation to 
the AU (fulfilled by Koen Vervaeke) has been partly an experiment, used to 
intertwine lessons with the EEAS. The EC Delegation office to the AU in 
Addis Ababa provided two concept notes on the lessons learnt that have been 
communicated to the EEAS (Vines 2010, p. 1107, note 39). 
The Lisbon Treaty has ratified the decision to link CSDP to CFSP, and this 
presumes the existence of a military capability, whether on a permanent basis 
or not (Simon et al. 2011, p. 10). It also reinforces the external action of the 
EU. However it remains uncertain how the common security and defence 
policy dimension of the Union may develop (Missiroli 2010, p. 15). Article 42 
of the TEU (enshrining a qualified mutual defence clause) has already 
impacted on the decision to terminate the organisation of the Western European 
Union (WEU). On the other hand, most of the new treaty articles in this area 
refer to developments that had already taken place before the treaty came into 
force (e.g. art. 43, the expansion of the scope of the Petersberg tasks; art. 44, 
the conducting of EU peace-building operations by only some member states; 
art. 45, the establishment of the European Defence Agency [EDA] which came 
to light in 2004). By contrast, a novelty in defence matters is represented by the 
method of permanent structured cooperation (PeSCo), artt. 42.6-46 TEU and 
related Protocol.[22] 
In the past, member states have pursued PeSCo outside the Treaties, through 
the WEU (e.g. Eurocorps, Euromarfor), and also bilaterally (Whitman and 
Juncos 2009, p. 44). The keenness of the member states to integrate further and 
cooperate in terms of defence will be further manifested by this system. 
In the domain of security and defence and military crisis management, France 
and Britain play a dominant role (as did France and Germany in the past in 
promoting community progress). For their part, the two countries signed a 
defence agreement in November 2010, but CSDP was hardly mentioned in the 
text, suggesting that, more than new commitments, they shared the burden of 
budgetary cuts. These two EU states together cover almost half of all defence 
expenditure in the EU (Missiroli 2010, p. 15). These being some of the 
dilemmas, the lessons and expectations in the current context of post-Lisbon 
military crisis management suggest that hope should be placed in the Franco-
British engagement in this area. It will be seen, in the near future, whether 
these two countries will overcome their resource limitations and will act as an 
incentive, or disincentive, for the other EU member states to increase their 
coordination efforts and create a united front within the CSDP and military 
crisis management operations. 
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Notes 
1. We adopt as definition of military crisis management a timely, short-term 
intervention by an actor, or a coalition of actors, finalised to mitigate an 
imminent deterioration of security conditions with the help of predominantly 
military means (Koops 2009, p. 3). Military crisis management operations are 
conducted by the EU under the ESDP/CSDP policy that was launched in 1999 
and entered its operational phase in 2003.  
2. Chapter VII gave the Security Council the right to determine the existence of any 
threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression, and the right to take both 
military and non- military action to restore international peace and security. 
UN Charter Chapter VII. San Francisco, 26 June 1945, Art. 39.  
3. Interview (May 2005), in Meyer 2006, p. 134.  
4. The Headline Goal 2010 was first introduced in a French ‘Non-Paper’ entitled 
‘Towards a   2010 Headline Goal’. This was further elaborated by an Italian 
Presidency Paper and again by a British ‘Non-Paper’ focusing on 
implementation, ‘The road to 2010’ (Quille 2006, p. 5).  
5. This option was used for Operation Concordia in the FYROM and for Operation 
Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
6. This formula was chosen for Operation Artemis in the DRC using French HQ, and 
EUFOR DRC employing the German HQ.  
7. For a detailed account of the origin of the EU OpsCen in Belgium and of the 
Tervuren Initiative, see Missiroli 2003, pp. 76�80.  
8. For the UNSC reform and implications for the EU/CFSP, see Marchesi 2010.  
9. For a view of the major reforms to EU foreign policy coordination, particularly at 
the UN,   introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, see Laatikainen 2010.  
10. Author’s interview with a EU Council officer, Brussels, September 2010.  
11. Author’s interview with a Political Security Committee officer, Brussels, 
October 2009.  
12. For MONUC’s mandate, see: Security Council SC/9552; 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/   docs/2008/sc9552.doc.htm [Accessed 23 
January 2009].  
13. Menon’s interviews with senior national and EU officials, London and 
Brussels,   December 2008.  
14. The EU diplomacy was based on the EU as the sponsor of the ceasefire, first, 
in January   2008 with the Goma accords with the backing of the UN and the 
US, and now, on 7 November, with the Nairobi agreement. The EU diplomacy 
was three-pronged: it sought to reinforce the ceasefire in Goma, to ensure that 
MONUC troops were properly deployed in the threatened areas, and to 
establish that all those people with links to the Rwandan general would not 
tolerate any further violence (Williams 2008).  
15. Speech by Carl Bildt, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden ‘Strengthening 
the ESDP. The EU’s Approach to International Security’, Helsinki, 18�19 
September 2008, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden. Available at 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/11378/a/112759 [Accessed 23 January 2011].  
16. For a view on African solutions to African problems and the gaps between the 
AU’s ambitions and the actual accomplishments, see Moller 2009.  
17. Author’s interview with a EU Council officer, Brussels, September 2010.  
18. See Colin S.G., 2002. Strategy for chaos: revolutions in military affairs and 
the evidence of history. London: Frank Cass; and General Sir Rupert Smith, 
2005. The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world. London: Allen 
Lane. For a view on how Europe’s defence was still configured for a Cold 
War that is long over, see Robertson, 2009.  
19. See Andersson, J.J. Crafting European security policy, p. 167. Andersson, J.J., 
2006. Armed and ready? The EU battlegroup concept and the Nordic 
battlegroup. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 29-33.  
20. Author’s interview with a senior national official, Berlin, September 2010.  
21. For military crisis management connected to and expanded by the practice of 
long-term oriented ‘capacity-building’, see Koops (2009). The reforms agreed 
in the Lisbon Treaty support the increasingly pronounced effort at embedding 
crisis management and stabilisation operations in a wider and more 
comprehensive response framework in the longer-term aims of stability-
building. The reforms aim at bridging the gap between the 
  intergovernmental Council and the supra-national Commission (Ellner 2008, 
p. 13).  
22. For a focus on the principles guiding Permanent Structured Cooperation, see 
Biscop 2008.  
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